The Fairness Doctrine: Fair to Whom by Menkes, Loretta T.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1981
The Fairness Doctrine: Fair to Whom
Loretta T. Menkes
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, and the First
Amendment Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, The Fairness Doctrine: Fair to Whom, 30 Clev. St. L. Rev. 485 (1981)
NOTES
THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: FAIR TO WHOM?
I. INTRODUCTION
R ADIO AND TELEVISION STATIONS, unlike newspapers, are licensed by
the federal government.1 The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) has been mandated by Congress2 to regulate broadcast licensees
in the public interest.3 In turn, the Commission has promulgated rules
and regulations to ensure that this public trust standard is met, such as
equal time," personal attack' and the fairness doctrine. This note will
Communications Act of 1934, § 301, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
Id § 303.
The statute authorizes issuance of broadcast licenses if the "public interest,
convenience, and necessity will be served thereby." Id § 307(d).
' Codified in § 315 which provides in pertinent part: "(a) If any licensee shall
permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use
a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such can-
didates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station...." This provision
was embodied in the original Communications Act of 1934. Subsequent attempts
to exempt bona fide newscasts from this requirement resulted in an amendment
in 1954 and included codification of the fairness doctrine. See note 6 infra. Com-
pare equal time requirements for broadcast licensees with Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state statute requiring newspaper
to provide candidate free space to reply to attack on public record held un-
constitutional). See generally CBS, Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 601 (1976) (interviews with
candidates on "60 Minutes" qualified as bona fide news interviews for exemption
under § 315(a)(2)); Socialist Workers 1968 Nat'l Campaign Comm., 14 F.C.C.2d 858
(1968) (denial of equal time for Presidential candidate because the licensee met
the requirement for bona fide news interview).
' In case of a "personal attack" against "the honesty, character, integrity or
like personal qualities of an identified person or group" during the discussion of a
controversial issue of public importance, the licensee is required to transmit to
the party attacked within seven days after the attack is broadcast "(1) notifica-
tion of the date, time and identification of the broadcast; (2) a script or tape (or an
accurate summary if a script or tape is not available) of the attack; and (3) an of-
fer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's facilities free of
charge." 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1978). See The Public and
Broadcasting-A Procedure Manual, 49 F.C.C.2d 1, 6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Procedure Manual]; Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir.
1976). The appellate court in Straus rejected the Commission's finding that the
licensee had violated personal attack rules, and criticized the agency for making,
in effect, its own de novo judgment. I& at 1010-11. See also International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NBC, 59 F.C.C.2d 1317 (1976); Henry Buchanan, 42
F.C.C.2d 430 (1973); John Salchert, 48 F.C.C.2d 346 (1974). Although the personal
attack and equal time provisions are closely related to the fairness doctrine and
involve similar issues, further discussion of these components will be limited to
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critically examine the fairness doctrine, its origin, standards and prac-
tical application, to ascertain whether it is fulfilling its intended purpose.
Under the fairness doctrine, a broadcast licensee has two obligations:
1) to devote a reasonable amount of programming time to controversial
issues of public importance; and 2) to offer a reasonable opportunity for
the presentation of contrasting viewpoints.' The Federal Communica-
tions Commission, charged with enforcement of this doctrine,' attempts
to harmonize the first amendment rights of the broadcaster with the
only those situations in which the fairness doctrine is directly implicated. See
generally Note, Personal Attack Rule and Professional Occupations: Consisten-
cy in FCC Decision-Making, 16 CALIF. W. L. REV. 399 (1980).
' Public Media Center v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1322, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Section
315(a) now reads:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified can-
didate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use
of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no
power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions
under this subsection. No obligation is imposed upon any licensee to
allow the use of its station by any such candidate. Appearance by a legal-
ly qualified candidate on any -
(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate
is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects
covered by the news documentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not
limited to political conventions and activities incidental thereto),
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the mean-
ing of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be con-
strued as relieving broadcasters in connection with the presentation of
newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot
coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under
this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable
opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public im-
portance.
47 U.S.C. § 315(a), Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557 (1976) (emphasis added). See
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See also FCC Report on
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949).
1 Section 303 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976), pro-
vides that the Commission shall, for public convenience, interest or necessity:
"[M]ake such regulations not inconsistent with law as it may deem necessary...
to carry out the provisions of this chapter .... See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) for a historical account of judicial ratification of FCC
rulemaking. See generally National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567
F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 926 (1978). The court of appeals
recognized the general rulemaking authority of the FCC but held that the Com-
mission acted unreasonably in requiring divestiture of only some owners of
newspaper-broadcast combinations. See note 149 infra and accompanying text.
But see Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d 488 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976) (the FCC has no jurisdiction to enforce the fairness




right of the public to be informed.! Although Congress has sanctioned
the regulation of broadcasters, restrictions must not take the form of
censorship and jeopardize valuable freedoms of speech and press. At the
same time, airwaves are considered a scarce resource, and licensees are
not permitted to monopolize them to the detriment of the public. A
balance is sought to achieve the ultimate goal of diversity in the
marketplace of ideas.
To reduce the threat of excessive government interference, the
broadcast licensee is accorded broad discretion in programming deci-
sions.' Unless personal attack or equal-time claims are raised, the broad-
caster must meet only standards of reasonableness and good faith.1" In
further deference to the broadcaster, overall programming is taken into
account to determine if there are fairness violations."
In practical application, the fairness doctrine has become a procedural
and substantive nightmare to complainants, broadcasters, the Commis-
sion and the courts. 2 The doctrine is plagued by a fundamental con-
tradiction: The FCC is strictly prohibited from censorship of content, 3
a Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of the Fairness
Report, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 694 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Reconsideration of
Fairness Report]. See also Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973). It is "the right of the public to be informed, rather
than any right on the part of the Government, any broadcast licensee or any in-
dividual member of the public to broadcast his own particular views on any mat-
ter .. " Id. at 112-13. The licensee must provide free time if the appropriate
spokesperson is unable to pay. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).
The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Fairness Report]; Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in
the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Fairness Doctrine Primer]. See note 57 infra and ac-
companying text.
10 Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 9. See Accuracy in Media, 42 F.C.C.2d 426
(1973) (the FCC ruling that an interview with Alger Hiss did not, in the licensee's
view, constitute a controversial issue of public importance was a judgment that
was reasonable and in good faith).
1 Reconsideration of Fairness Report, supra note 8, at 695. The Commission
has consistently ruled that no private individual or group has a right to command
the use of broadcast facilities. The licensee, therefore, is not required to provide
a forum for any particular person on any particular program or series of pro-
grams. Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 8. See, e.g., International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 59 F.C.C.2d 1317 (1976); Michael McKee, 49 F.C.C.2d 1258 (1974);
Voice for Innocent Victims of Abortion, 42 F.C.C.2d 335 (1973). See generally
Suzuki v. WOW-TV, 59 F.C.C.2d 1122 (1976).
12 See generally Note, Broadcast Deregulation and the First Amendment
Restraint on Private Control, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV 517 (1980); Note, The Fairness
Doctrine: Time for the Graveyard?, 2 FORDHAM L. REV. 563 (1974); see also F.
FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD GUYS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1976).
13 "Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Com-
mission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
1981]
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yet examination of content is necessary to determine if there have been
fairness violations. The FCC, sensitive to first amendment concerns, has
promulgated extremely restrictive procedural requirements for com-
plaints, including a burden of proof that is difficult to overcome. 4
Without these procedures, however, the Commission fears that the duty
to respond to the excessive number of complaints initiated would be
overly burdensome to licensees," and as a result, licensees might avoid
programming related to controversial issues. Thus, the public interest
in diversity in the marketplace of ideas would suffer. 6 Under the cur-
rent system, though, a lack of clearly defined standards has lead to ar-
bitrary decision-making by the FCC. Since the FCC is given broad discre-
tion to administer the doctrine, seven politically appointed Commis-
sioners"' become the standard bearers of the nation's morality. More im-
portantly, the doctrine, because of these ill-defined guidelines, is subject
to manipulation in order to further favored political views.
This Note contends that the fairness doctrine, as presently applied,
fails to meet its legislative purpose and violates constitutionally pro-
tected rights. 8 This Note will examine the standards and policies
established by the FCC as judicially approved in Red Lion Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC" and American Sec. Council Educ. Foundation v.
FCC." Practical application of these standards and policies will be ex-
plored in three categories: 1) controversial issue programming; 2) com-
mercial advertisements; and 3) political messages. Finally, a solution to
the arbitrary and discriminatory application of this amorphous doctrine
will be suggested.
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be pro-
mulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free
speech by means of radio communication." 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976).
" Diocesan Union of Holy Name Societies of Rockville, 43 F.C.C.2d 548 (1973).
Dissent of Commissioner Nicholas Johnson attacked the majority decision for the
"procedural straight-jacket" in which it "straps fairness complaintants," which
consequently denies a substantive ruling. Id. at 548-49. In fiscal year 1976, only 24
of 41,861 complaints led to station inquiries, and of the 24, only 16 resulted in rul-
ings adverse to broadcasters. Simmons, Fairness Doctrine: The Early History, 29
FED. CoM. B.J. 207 (1976), reprinted in S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND
THE MEDIA 16-71 (1978). See notes 67-69 infra and accompanying text.
"1 Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 8. For example, in 1973 the Commission
received about 2,400 fairness complaints. After initial screening, only ninety-four
of these were forwarded to licensees for response.
" See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Court in
Red Lion alluded to this speculative danger, but postponed this issue for future
consideration if, indeed, the burden on licensees became too great. Id. at 393.
' 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1976).
' U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV. See generally W. FRANCOIS, MASS MEDIA LAW
AND REGULATION 15-32 (2d ed. 1978) (for discussion of first amendment theories);
id. at 477-96 (for discussion of fairness doctrine development).
It 395 U.S. 367 (1969).




II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
A. Genesis
Historically, government regulation of the broadcast media was in-
tended to deal with only technological problems, not program content
deficiencies. In the 1920's, rapid development of radio communication
controlled solely by the private sector led to chaotic use of airwaves.21
Recognizing the need for a more rational approach to allocation of
licenses, assignment of frequencies, and regulation of signal strength,
Congress enacted the Radio Act of 1927,"2 creating a five member Radio
Commission to regulate in the public interest. Many of the provisions of
that Radio Act, including the public interest standard, were incor-
porated into the Communications Act of 1934,23 which created the
Federal Communications Commission." The FCC instituted rules,
regulations, and policy standards for licensees. Authority granted to the
FCC by the Communications Act was circumscribed only by a duty to
promote the public interest."5 The scope of this initial grant of authority,
however, must be viewed in the context in which it was given. Since air-
waves were considered a limited resource "6 and not available to all who
21 For a complete history of the origin and development of broadcast regula-
tion see D. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF BROADCASTING: LAW AND POLICY TOWARDS
RADIO, TELEVISION AND CABLE COMMUNICATIONS (1979).
1 Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), as amended by Pub. L. No. 494, 46
Stat. 844 (1930), repealed, Pub L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1102 (1934). Alternatives to the
final draft which would have limited the scope of licensee discretion were con-
sidered but rejected. The legislators, instead, chose to eliminate common carrier
obligations and restrict the right of access to candidates for public office. See
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940) for legislative history
of Radio Act of 1927.
23 See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
105-10, 134-35 (1973) for detailed analysis of legislative intent. See also National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-14 (1943).
2' Once again Congress rejected a proposal that would have required equal
response time for presentation of views "on a public question to be voted upon at
an election .. " See H.R. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1934).
1 See note 7 supra. See also Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). The Commission's responsibility is to determine
whether overall performance of a licensee constitutes a sustained good faith ef-
fort to fully and fairly inform the public. Id at 126. Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the Court, characterized the FCC as an "overseer," "ultimate arbiter and
guardian of the public interest ... " Id. at 117. Conversely, the licensee's role was
that of "public trustee," whose duty was to fairly and impartially inform the
listening and viewing public. Id.
" See Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 4-5. But see FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (regulation of cable). See generally Comment,
Regulated Industries: Federal Communications Commission-Supreme Court In-
validates Regulations Requiring Cable Broadcasters to Provide Public Ac-
cess-FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1023 (1980). Many
19811
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wished to use them, allocation was to be based on the ability to serve
the general public. 7 Congress never intended nor anticipated that the
FCC would become a regulator of program content. 8 In fact, the Com-
munications Act expressly prohibits content censorship.2
Growth of the FCC's authority over program content has been the
result of administrative activism, coupled with legislative ambiguity."
For many years following the creation of the FCC, implementation of
agency policy and procedures went largely unnoticed by Congress and
the courts. In 1943, however, the authority to regulate programming in
the public interest was condoned by the Supreme Court in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States." Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
Court, affirmed the authority of the FCC to adopt regulations regarding
chain broadcasting.2 He cautioned that "these provisions [of the Act], in-
dividually and in the aggregate, preclude the notion that the Commis-
sion is empowered to deal only with technical and engineering im-
pediments to the 'larger and more effective use of radio in the public in-
terest.' "" While FCC action was found to be within the authority
argue that the limited resource justification for regulation is no longer applicable
since cable has expanded access opportunities.
See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
See Hearings on S 2910 before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1934). See also note 24 supra. While Secretary of Com-
merce, Herbert Hoover testified before a House Committee in the early 1920s:
"We can not allow any single person or group to place themselves in [a] position
where they can censor the material which shall be broadcasted to the public, nor
do I believe that the government should ever be placed in the position of censor-
ing this material." Hearing on H.R. 7357 Before the House Comm. on the Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1924), reprinted in Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1973).
See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
One commentator has observed that "the statutory scheme, although little
changed by Congress since its inception, is not the product of a clear, full blown
theory of how to handle the special problem of broadcasting, but is a curiously ad
hoc effort .... [O]ver-all the agency is given broad regulatory powers under the
vague standard of 'public interest, convenience and necessity.'" Kalven,
Broacasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. OF L. & ECON. 15, 26
(1967). Cf Commissioner Hooks expressed support of the fundamental precept
underlying the fairness doctrine, via reasonably fair coverage of controversial
issues, but lamented the "Commission's progressively active interpretations
which have unfortunately transfigured a simple tenet of conscientious service into
an alleged super-straightjacket structure." Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 52.
319 U.S. 190 (1943).
These regulations restricted network control over local stations by curtail-
ing rates charged by the network for programs, network option time provisions,
length of contract term between local stations and the network, and provisions
for territorial exclusivity and exclusive affiliation. They focused on antitrust con-
cerns and reflected FCC policy that the station owner should not delegate his
responsibility to the public. Id.
I Id at 217. Judicial scrutiny ended with the determination that FCC action




delegated by the Communications Act, the constitutionality of the
agency's exercise of authority was upheld only under these narrow
facts."4 The decision addressed the authority of the FCC to regulate
business practices, rather than the constitutionality of content control.
First amendment rights of broadcasters were not really at issue, yet
Justice Frankfurter's broad dicta has been read to confer blanket
judicial sanction of FCC regulation.
Following this judicial stamp of approval, the FCC gradually expanded
its authority over the content of programming by imposing "fairness"
obligations on broadcasters. 5 The Commission justified this exercise of
authority as regulation in the public interest. Thus, the concept of the
fairness doctrine, which in subsequent years has become increasingly
troublesome, developed not in the legislature or the judiciary, but
rather through administrative action.
In 1959 Congress amended the Communications Act to exempt bona
fide newscasts from equal time requirements.3" The legislators express-
ed concern that this exemption might lead to abuses by the news
media.37 To prevent such abuses, the phrase now known as the "fairness
doctrine" was added "to serve as a warning ... that the discretion being
granted ... will be carefully screened."' Yet, this fairness doctrine com-
ponent of the amendment has been interpreted by the courts and the
FCC as rendering Congressional approval to prior Commission prac-
tices.39 What began as a warning to exempted newscasters has mush-
roomed into extensive scrutiny of program content by the FCC.
B. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
The fairness doctrine did not come under direct constitutional attack
until Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC." In that case a licensee refused
delegated by Congress. Id at 224. In evaluating the benefits of the Communica-
tions Act, the Court expressed the need to prevent wealth from monopolizing
radio frequencies.
", Id. at 224. This limitation has gone virtually unnoticed in subsequent deci-
sions. But see Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 4. The Commission recognized
that NBC v. United States left many first amendment questions unanswered.
Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licencees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976). See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in [19591 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2564, 2572-73.
' Id Senator Pastore identified the underlying principle of the fairness doc-
trine as the right of the people to "full and complete disclosure of conflicting
views on news of interest .... 105 CONG. REc. 17,830 (1959).
" See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969). "[T]he
amendment vindicated the FCC's general view that the fairness doctrine inhered
in the public interest standard." Id But see Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). Congressional acquiescence to FCC interpretation of
"bona fide news events" for more than ten years did not establish the validity of
inclusion of debates and press conferences. Id.
10 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
19811
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an FCC order to provide free time for response to a personal attack, in
violation of the fairness doctrine. The licensee challenged the Commis-
sion's authority to enforce such orders. In a unanimous decision," the
Supreme Court held that, despite the first amendment, the FCC could
require licensees to provide time for response to personal attack and
political editorials. These FCC rules and regulations were found to be
within the delegated authority of the Communications Act and consis-
tent with the first amendment."2 The Court reasoned that "in adopting
the new regulations the Commission was implementing Congressional
policy rather than embarking on a frolic of its own.'" 3
The Court in Red Lion emphasized the need for government control
of the airwaves, because the number of broadcast frequencies were
limited." The Court stated that the licensee, using the airwaves as a
public trust, had a fiduciary duty to promote the public interest. 5 Rejec-
ting the contention that the FCC ruling abridged freedom of speech and
press, the Court reasoned that the characteristic differences between
broadcast and print justified application of different first amendment
standards." Limitation of available frequencies, the Court explained,
precluded application of first amendment rights under these cir-
cumstances. 7 The Court noted that every person who wanted to speak,
write, or publish could do so, but every person who wanted to broadcast
could not. The Court warned that "[n]o one has a First Amendment right
to a license or to monopolize a frequency to the exclusion of his fellow
citizens."'8 The Court hastened to distinguish this permissible incursion
into first amendment rights from prohibited interference: The FCC was
free to require licensees to provide a forum for discussion of controver-
sial issues only by "reasonable rules and regulations which fall short of
abridgement of the freedom of speech and press, and of the censorship
" Justice Douglas took no part in the Court's decision. A subsequent concurr-
ing opinion by Justice Douglas in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), suggests that had he been available to vote in
Red Lion the decision would not have been unanimous: "The Fairness Doctrine
has no place in our First Amendment regime. It puts the head of the camel inside
the tent and enables administration after administration to toy with TV or radio
in order to serve its sordid or its benevolent ends." Id at 154.
4 395 U.S. at 386-94.
's Id at 375.
Id at 376.
Id at 389.
46 Id at 386. The goal of the first amendment was to "preserve an uninhibited
market place of ideas, .. . rather than to countenance monopolization of that
market, whether it be by the government itself or a private licensee." Id at 390.
" Id at 388-89.
48 Id. at 389. The Court felt that the fairness doctrine actually enhanced the
first amendment by assuring access for differing viewpoints. Id See also




proscribed by §326 of the Act." 9 Unfortunately, the Court failed to
establish guidelines to determine when the FCC was exceeding its pro-
per authority.
Although the Court in Red Lion expressly limited the decision to the
constitutionality of the personal attack and political editorial rules and
refrained from giving blanket approval to all FCC action, 5 the ruling
has generally been read to confer broad powers upon the Commission.
Little reference has been made to the Court's warning that if future en-
forcement led to reduced, rather than increased coverage of controver-
sial issues, the constitutionality of the doctrine would need to be re-
examined.51
It is crucial to note that the Court in Red Lion upheld the constitu-
tionality of the fairness doctrine only on its face, not as applied:
There is no question here of the Commission's refusal to permit
the broadcaster to carry a particular program or to publish his
own views; of a discriminatory refusal to require the licensee to
broadcast certain views which have been denied access to the
airwaves; of government censorship of a particular program con-
trary to §326; or of the official government view dominating
public broadcasting. Such questions would raise more serious
First Amendment issues. 2
These very questions have now been raised by the Commission's ar-
bitrary application of the fairness doctrine. The time has come to test
the constitutionality of the application issue left open in Red Lion.
Since Red Lion, the Commission has intensified its scrutiny of pro-
gram content "in the public interest" and the courts have continued to
defer to this type of administrative expansionism." Interference that
would never be tolerated in the print media has come to be accepted in
broadcasting, even though the characteristic differences enumerated in
Red Lion have diminished. 4 While the scope of a court's review of the
49 395 U.S. at 382. The right of the viewers, not the broadcaster, was para-
mount. Id at 390.
' Id. at 396. The Court criticized the Communications Act in general for im-
precision in substantive standards. The Court reasoned that if the generalized
"public interest" standard had not been held constitutionally infirm in the past,
the more definitive standards for personal attack and political editorializing
should also sustain attack. Id at 384-85.
1 Id at 393. At that time, the Court felt that the danger of causing a chill on
the coverage of controversial issues was remote. Id. at 392-93.
52 Id at 396.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
102 (1973). See generally Note, Judicial Role of FCC Decisionmaking, 21 B.C.L.
REV. 1067 (1980).
' Chief Judge Bazelon, in dissent, suggested that it was time for "the Com-
missioner to draw back and consider whether time and technology have so erod-
1981]
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FCC has been limited to a determination that the Commission's order
was reasonable or within statutory purpose,"5 the FCC's application of
the fairness doctrine has failed to pass even this minimum test.
C. Complaint Procedure
The fairness doctrine is a double-edged sword. Aside from the threat
to the free speech and press rights of the broadcaster, implementation
of the doctrine imposes serious infringment upon the due process rights
of the complainant. The FCC is forced to play a perpetual tug of war,
trying to balance the rights of the licensee with the rights of the viewer
or listener.
The licensee has a right to freedom of speech and press, to be free
from unreasonable government interference. "In view of profound, un-
questioned national commitment embodied in the Frst [sic]
Amendment," the FCC recognizes that its goal "must be to foster
'uninhibited, robust, wide-open' debate on public issues."" To achieve
this goal, the FCC claims to place broad discretion in the licensee's jour-
nalistic judgment57 and limit FCC intervention to incidents in which the
ed the necessity for governmental imposition of fairness obligations that the doc-
trine has come to defeat its purposes in a variety of circumstances." Brandywine-
Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
See note 26 supra and accompanying text. Cable has expanded access
possibilities and newspapers are becoming more of a scarce resource than broad-
cast stations. The majority in Columbia Broadcasting recognized that there were
many more broadcasting stations than daily newspapers. 412 U.S. at 144. But see
Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 6. The Commission rejects the view that scarcity
is no longer a concern.
I See American Sec. Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). But see Fidelity Television, Inc. v.
FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Review of administrative action is limited
to these findings:
(1) the agency acted within bounds of its statutory and constitutional
authority;
(2) the agency followed its own procedural rules and regulations;
(3) the agency's findings are reasonably articulated and based on
substantial evidence in the record as a whole;
(4) the agency did not substantially deviate from past decisions without
sufficient explanation;
(5) in general the agency engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.
I Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 1, quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See generally Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975).
11 The licensee is given broad discretion to determine whether a subject con-
stitutes a controversial issue, the format of the programs devoted to the issue,
and which spokesperson to present opposing views. Fairness Doctrine Primer,
supra note 9, at 599.
There can be no one all embracing formula which licensees can hope to
apply to insure the fair and balanced presentation of all public issues.




licensee had acted unreasonably and in bad faith. In order to evaluate
the reasonableness of the licensee's action, however, the Commission is
compelled to examine program content. Thus despite claims to the con-
trary, the FCC becomes the sole arbiter of what constitutes reasonable
coverage of a controversial issue of public importance and can directly
impact its decision on the licensee.' In the past the Commission has
assured that they "have no intention of becoming involved in the selec-
tion of issues to be discussed."' 9 The following discussion illustrates that
this commitment to neutrality is impossible to achieve under the pre-
sent system.
The licensee's first amendment freedom is also threatened by the ex-
cessive number of fairness complaints filed each year. If no restrictions
were imposed, the broadcaster would certainly become overburdened.
Responding to the thousands of complaints filed each year could con-
sume the majority of the licensee's time and impair its ability to effec-
tively disseminate information over the airwaves." The FCC has at-
tempted to reduce this burden by imposing stringent procedural re-
quirements"1 for filing fairness complaints in an effort to weed out
frivolous claims.2 The result is that only a small number of complaints
ever pass these difficult threshold tests and require licensee response. 3
While few infractions have resulted in serious repercussions for the
judgment and good sense in determining what subjects should be con-
sidered, the particular format of the programs to be devoted to each sub-
ject, the different shades of opinion to be presented, and the spokesmen
for each point of view.
FCC Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1251 (1949).
1 See generally Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amend-
ment, 10 J. OF L. & ECON. 15 (1967). The author highlights the conflict between
regulation of broadcasting and first amendment freedoms: "We have at the mo-
ment the worst of all possible worlds. There is official lip service to freedom of
the press in broadcasting but no agreement that there is anything the Commis-
sion cannot do," Id. at 38.
5 Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 10.
' See Community-Service Broadcasting of Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d
1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978), where the court held that an FCC requirement that all non-
commercial educational stations which received federal funding make audio
recordings of all broadcasts discussing controversial issues was an unconstitu-
tional infringement of first and fifth amendment rights.
01 See generally Reconsideration of Fairness Report, supra note 8; Note, Com-
munications Law-FCC Fairness Doctrine Procedures-A Complainant Runs
Aground on the Commission's Procedural Shoals, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 775
(1980).
62 See American Sec. Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Allen C. Phelps, 21 F.C.C.2d 12, 13
(1969). See generally Dr. Michael Kielty, 69 F.C.C.2d 960 (1978); Horace P.
Rowley III, 39 F.C.C.2d 437 (1973).
'3 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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licensee, 4 fairness violations remain an ever-present threat. The FCC
can and does wield tremendous power over broadcasters through a
"raised eyebrow" approach. 5 If a licensee has violated fairness obliga-
tions, not only can the FCC require immediate compliance, but the FCC
may also consider these violations as demerits for license renewal pur-
poses. Since license renewal occurs every three years," the threat re-
mains very real for the licensee.
The viewers' rights are often in direct conflict with those of the
licensee. Under the fairness doctrine the viewer or listener has a right
to receive access to balanced coverage of controversial issues of public
importance and to expect the licensee to operate in the public interest.
When these rights are abridged, there should be recourse through our
administrative and judicial process. Legitimate claims should not be
bridled with procedural roadblocks. According to the Commission,
fairness complaints67 must focus on a specific factual issue66 and present
prima facie evidence sufficient to support the claim. 9 The following
basic requirements must be met:
"E.g., FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223 (1946); see American Broadcasting Co., 52
F.C.C.2d 98 (1974), aff'd, 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also KMAP, Inc., 72
F.C.C.2d 241 (1979) (despite repeated allegations for over ten years, the FCC
granted renewal but warned that they would closely scrutinize the next renewal
application); Cairo Broadcasting Co., 63 F.C.C.2d 586 (1977); Springfield Televi-
sion Broadcasting Corp., 59 F.C.C.2d 110 (1976) (complaints were raised by a cable
television company competing with the station); Capitol Broadcasting Co., 40
F.C.C. 615 (1964) (the FCC found fairness violations but granted renewal because
the licensee had recently adopted new procedures).
65 See Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D.
Calif. 1976), vacated, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
See also Melody Music, Inc., 2 F.C.C.2d 958 (1966) (the FCC conditioned license
renewal on the proviso that the station be sold).
47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976).
e Persons believing that a broadcaster is not meeting fairness obligations
must first try reconciliation with the broadcaster. If these attempts fail, com-
plaints may be filed with the FCC. In an interview with the news director of a
network owned station, this author was informed that a standard response to
callers who lodge fairness complaints with the station is that fairness obligations
have been met with overall programming.
" See American Sec. Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Hakkie S. Tamimie, 42 F.C.C.2d 876,
877 (1973) (complaint that attacked coverage of "Middle East" on educational net-
work dismissed for failure to specify "the particular aspect of the general topic
which was discussed.").
69 Prima facie evidence is evidence which is sufficient in law to sustain a find-
ing in favor of a claim, but which may be contradicted. See BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1353 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See generally Columbus Broadcasting Coalition v.
FCC, 505 F.2d 320, 323-24, 326-30 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing prima facie evidence





(1) the name of the station or network involved; (2) the con-
troversial issue of public importance on which a view was
presented; (3) the date and time of its broadcast; (4) the basis of
[the] claim that the issue is controversial and of public impor-
tance; (5) an accurate summary of the view [or] views broadcast;
(6) the basis of [the] claim that the station or network has not
broadcast contrasting views on the issue or issues in its overall
programming; and (7) whether the station or network has afford-
ed, or expressed the intention to afford, a reasonable opportunity
for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on that issue."
While on their face these rules appear reasonable, ambiguous standards
and inconsistent enforcement have resulted in arbitrary and capricious
decision-making. The FCC relies on an ad hoc system of rulemaking
which rarely leads to predictable results. It is this very system which
has led to expanded regulation of content. It appears that the FCC has
become more involved in content regulation than Congress, the courts
or the administrators themselves had ever intended.
D. American Security Council Education Foundation v. FCC
Often, the FCC dismisses complaints on procedural rather than on
substantive grounds.7' American Sec. Council Educ. Foundation v. FCC"'
70 Broadcast Procedural Manual, supra note 5, at 5. These requirements were
set out with much more specificity than previous policy standards:
Complainant should submit...
(1) the particular station involved;
(2) the particular issue of a control nature discussed over the air;
(3) the date and time when the program was carried;
(4) the basis for the claim that the station has presented only one side of
the question; and(5) whether the station had afforded, or has plans to afford, an oppor-
tunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints.
Fairness Doctrine Primer, supra note 9, at 600. The Fairness Doctrine Primer re-
quirements were upheld as "not unreasonable" in Democratic Nat'l Comm. v.
FCC, 460 F.2d 891, 907 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972).
" See Diocesan Union of Holy Name Societies, 43 F.C.C.2d 548, 549 (1973)(Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting). The FCC has expressly denied responsibility for
review of claims that do not adhere to strict procedural requirements: "It is not
the proper function of the administering agency to frame the complaints coming
before it and it is incumbent upon the complaining party to bring before us a
prima facie complaint." American Sec. Council Educ. Foundation, 63 F.C.C.2d
366, 368 (1977) (quoting Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 8, at
696). See also Robin Ficker, 65 F.C.C.2d 657 (1977) (allegations of lack of news
coverage of a political candidate were dismissed because the complainant was not
a consistent viewer, and therefore had no proof of overall programming content).
2 607 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980). ASCEF is a
nonprofit educational institution, known for its conservative views. See Com-
ment, The Fairness Doctrine and Claims of Systematic Imbalance in Television
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is an example of the procedural straight-jacket that the FCC has devised.
In that case the complaint to the FCC, based upon a three-year study,
alleged that a television network's news broadcasts were slanted in the
presentation of matters relating to "national security." The meth-
odology used in the study consisted of monitoring the Evening News of
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) for two years, classifying views
expressed on the air into one of three categories labeled "Viewpoint A,"
"Viewpoint B" and "Viewpoint C."73 Documentation of both the pro-
cedure used in the study and the resulting conclusions was extensive."
The court of appeals affirmed the FCC ruling which found that the com-
plainant failed to meet prima facie evidence requirements because it
failed to focus on a particular, well-defined issue. The finding of the
court was based on the grounds that: 1) American Security Council
Education Foundation (ASCEF) had failed to sufficiently focus on a topic
with which to evaluate the balance of news coverage; and 2) a contrary
finding would impose an undue burden on the licensee."
The court stressed the importance of focusing on specific, well-defined
issues. If this procedure were not enforced, the court warned, an imper-
iissible burden on the licensee would result, thus producing a "chill" on
broadcasting. The court explained that the study was insufficient
because the separate issues comprising the general issue of "national
security" in the ASCEF complaint had too tangential a relationship to
each other.
76
Ironically, in a footnote the court acknowledged that "there is no
doubt that most of the issues aggregated by ASCEF under the umbrella
News Broadcasting: American Security Council Education Foundation v. FCC, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1980). The author supported the majority's position. But see
F. FRIENDLY, supra note 12 at 167-91 for a fascinating behind-the-scenes account
of this case.
73 Viewpoint A -the threat to U.S. security is more serious than the govern-
ment perceives and the U.S. should increase national security.
Viewpoint B-perception of possible threat is essentially correct and the
government should maintain the status quo.
Viewpoint C-the threat to U.S. security is less serious than perceived and
government security efforts should be decreased.
Data indicated that Viewpoint A was underrepresented and Viewpoint C
overrepresented. The court discussed at great length the methodological defi-
ciencies of the study. Placement of views within the three categories was
especially conducive to subjective bias.
"' ASCEF submitted a 209 page report entitled TV and National Defense: An
Analysis of CBS News, 1972-73. 607 F.2d at 462 (dissenting opinion).
" Id. at 448. In reaching this decision the court reiterated that its scope of
review was limited to determining the reasonableness and good faith of FCC ac-
tion. Id at 447.
76 Id. at 449. The court hastened to add that fairness complaints may be based
on a general issue comprised of separately identifiable sub-issues. In this in-
stance, however, the views expressed were divided into artificial categories




of 'national security' are controversial issues of public importance."7 7
Despite this finding, the court dismissed the case without exploring the
substantive issue of whether or not CBS had engaged in biased news
reporting.
The court instead imposed an additional requirement on the complai-
nant: "[Tihe broadcaster must have a clear understanding of the issue,"
and must be able to "recognize the issue 'with precision and
accuracy.' "78 It now appears as if the licensee's subjective knowledge is
to be added to the list of procedural requirements for the complainant.
In the final analysis, the court used a new balancing test, weighing the
burden imposed on the licensee against the benefit derived to the
public. This result seems very far removed from the initial goal of the
fairness doctrine, which is to ensure that the public not be left uninformed
and to increase diversity in the marketplace of ideas.
Whatever the deficiencies of the study may have been, the court's
analysis failed to address the real issue: whether the fairness doctrine
can ever be implemented in a manner that is fundamentally fair to the
licensee, the complainant and the viewing public in general. Judge
Bazelon in his concurring opinion poignantly stated his answer to that
question:
This case vividly illustrates the substantial consititutional perils
inherent in the fairness doctrine. Unlike the personal attack and
political editorial components of the fairness doctrine upheld in
Red Lion, applying the fairness doctrine to daily news coverage
poses a serious threat to the independence of the broadcast
press.
I heartily subscribe to the basic principle that underlies the fair-
ness doctrine-"the paramount right of the public in a free
society to be informed and to have presented to it for accep-
tance and rejection the different attitudes and viewpoints [on]
vital and often controversial issues. . . ." I harbor grave doubts,
however, that the fairness doctrine promotes this goal. Certainly,
what benefits it may have generated in diversity have been
undercut by the tendency of the fairness doctrine to suppress
coverage of controversy altogether."9
Id. at 450 n.38.
78 Id. at 451 (quoting from the FCC ruling, 63 F.C.C.2d at 368). The appellate
court rejected the notion that the FCC action on a complaint was prohibited
whenever additional but unnecessary material was included. Instead, the FCC
was to examine the core issue wherever discernible. Contra, Hunger in America,
20 F.C.C.2d 143 (1969).
Id. at 459 (concurring opinion). See National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516
F.2d 1101, 1156, 1172-77 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). In that case
Judge Bazelon expressed concern regarding the constitutionality of the fairness
doctrine.
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Most troublesome in this regulatory scheme is the broad discretion
given the FCC to apply the fairness doctrine. That agency's mandate to
be ideologically neutral in areas so vital to fundamental freedoms of
speech and press is endangered by the discrimination inherent in the
system. The Commission is comprised of political appointees."0 In an ef-
fort to select persons with expertise in the area, those chosen often
come from and ultimately return to the very industry which must be
scrutinized. Vague standards disguised as broad discretion only com-
pound the problem. Although the goal of the doctrine was to promote
the widest possible diversity of information, the result has been to con-
strain "fairness" to the limited interpretation of the Commissioners. A
closer examination of past FCC rulings will graphically illustrate this
anomaly.
III. ELEMENTS OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
A. Controversial Issue
The first step in raising a fairness violation is to establish that a topic
constitutes a controversial issue of public importance. While seemingly
simplistic, interpretation of this element by the FCC has led to rather
bizarre results. The Commission has repeatedly asserted that the essen-
tial basis of the fairness doctrine is that the American public must not
be left uninformed.' Yet, the Commission usually defers to the
licensee's judgment to determine when an issue is controversial, the
very same licensee whose original act or omission led to the complaint.
In determining whether an issue is controversial, the FCC claims to
consider the following factors: 1) "the degree of attention paid to an
issue by government officials, community leaders, and the media," and
2) "whether an issue is the subject of vigorous debate with substantial
elements of the community in opposition to one another."''
In one case, a claim requesting opportunity for contrasting views on
what the complainant considered "amoral . . . avant garde thinking
about sexual relationships" on a television program was rejected by the
Commission.83 The FCC determined that there was insufficient informa-
tion to show that the "'sexual aspects' of relationships between the
sexes constituted a controversial issue of public importance." '84 Perhaps
the claim might have failed on other grounds, such as, the licensee had
met his fairness obligations in overall programming. But to deny that
sexual relationships constitute a controversial issue in the 1960's and
'o See note 17 supra.
8, Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 329 (1971).
82 Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 12.
1 Thomas J. Houser, 52 F.C.C.2d 477 (1975).




1970's era of "free love" seems contradictory to the factors upon which
the FCC purports to rely.
Religion is another topic which the Commission has deemed non-
controversial, even though the fairness doctrine is based upon society's
right to hear and discuss all sides of important issues. In one case, the
Commission deferred to the licensee's judgment that atheism did not
constitute a controversial issue. 5 The broadcast by the same station of
church services, devotionals and prayers failed to alter the
Commission's decision. The licensee's judgment was determined to be
reasonable and in good faith and the Commission refused to intervene in
these types of programming decisions. Commissioner Loevinger, in dis-
sent, cautioned that "good faith alone is not and cannot be a criterion of
fairness in action." '86 He pointed out that this decision runs contrary to
another FCC ruling 7 in which the exclusive broadcasting of one
religious viewpoint was not in the public interest. Loevinger criticized
the Commission for only giving support to viewpoints which it shared.
He emphasized that the FCC has no jurisdiction over religious matters.
"The time is long past due for this Commission to recognize at least the
Constitutional limits on its authority." 8
In a similar, more recent case89 a viewer objected to prayer recital on
"Romper Room," a program directed at pre-school children. The licensee
rejected the claim and the FCC upheld that decision as reasonable and
in good faith. In a strong dissent, Commissioner Johnson emphasized
that the Commission has an obligation to remain neutral and is forbid-
den by the Constitution from participating in the establishment of
religion. Citing recent Supreme Court rulings which prohibited
Madalyn Murray, 5 R.R.2d 263 (1965). In a concurring opinion, Chairman
William Henry emphasized the licensee's obligation to present opposing view-
points on controversial issues, regardless of program format involved. Fairness
obligations could conceivably arise from paid announcements, official speeches,
editorials, or religious broadcasts. In this case, the Commissioner agreed that
there was no showing that the religious broadcast contained a view on a con-
troversial issue, even though he acknowledged that differences in belief was a
sensitive area.
Id. at 269.
87 George E. Borst, 4 R.R.2d 697 (1965). See also Trinity Methodist Church v.
Federal Radio Commission, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599
(1933) (the Commission denied application for renewal on the ground, inter alia,
that the station had been used to attack the Catholic Church).
Madalyn Murray, 5 R.R.2d at 270.
89 Robert H. Scott, 25 F.C.C.2d 239 (1970).
Id. at 240. Johnson quoted the ruling in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,
495 (1961), that "neither a state nor the Federal Government ... can constitu-
tionally ... impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers,
and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in God, as against those
religions founded on different beliefs." Id. See also Young Peoples' Ass'n for the
Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938) (the FCC refused a license to ap-
plicants seeking a religious station).
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religious prayers in public schools,9 ' Johnson expressed concern that
these pre-schoolers were particularly vulnerable. Nonetheless, it ap-
pears that the Commission remains willing to defer to the licensee's
judgment even when that judgment abridges constitutional freedoms.
B. Public Importance
To pass the threshold test for a valid claim, not only must a claimant
establish that a topic discussed on a broadcast is controversial; it must
also appear to the licensee that the issue is of public importance.
According to the Fairness Report,92 factors to consider are the degree of
media coverage, the degree of attention the issue has received from
governmental officials and other community leaders and, most impor-
tantly, the subjective evaluation of the impact that the issue is likely to
have on the community at large. 3 While a Kiwanis Club's proposal for
location of a new public park and an investigation of college textbooks
by a state committee were deemed controversial issues of public impor-
tance,. the conflict in Northern Ireland95 and the Middle East crisis
96
were not.
In one case, the Commission stressed that media coverage and govern-
mental attention were subordinated to the subjective evaluation of im-
pact on the community. 7 The licensee had determined, and the Commis-
sion upheld, that a request by cable operators to counter negative
publicity on the licensee's station did not constitute a controversial
issue of public importance, even though response in the community had
been substantial. This case illustrates another irony in the Commission's
regulatory scheme: The licensee was given discretion to determine
91 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
92 See Fairness Report, supra note 9.
'3 Id at 11-12.
Mid-Florida Television Corp., 40 F.C.C. 620 (1964). The Commission chastised
the licensee for failure to present contrasting viewpoints on these issues.
' Los Angeles Irish Coalition for Fairness in the Media, 52 F.C.C.2d 681
(1975).
" Hakki S. Tamimie, 42 F.C.C.2d 876 (1973). Claimant requested an opportunity
to respond to the Israeli viewpoint expressed by Abba Eban on a program entitled
the "Kup Show." The FCC dismissed the complaint for failure "to specify the par-
ticular aspect of the general topic which was discussed." Id at 877.
' Arkansas Cable Television, 58 F.C.C.2d 192, 196 (1976). The station an-
nounced that it would be unable to carry live coverage of a college football game
as planned because cable operators were unwilling to honor a request not to
broadcast the game. Claimants cited newspaper articles, numerous phone calls,
and sixteen minutes of a ninety minute newscast as evidence that the issue was
of public importance. The FCC upheld the licensee's judgment that the subject




whether an issue concerning a competing enterprise rose to the level of
public importance and the standard applied was one of subjectivity.
In another complaint a viewer requested contrasting viewpoints to a
"60 Minutes" report that presented the private guard industry in an un-
favorable light. 8 The FCC ruled that the evidence provided by the
claimant was insufficient to establish public importance of the issue.9 ' In
addition to other requirements to establish prima facie evidence, the
complainant would have the further burden of substantiating the follow-
ing: the degree of attention received by government officials and other
community leaders; subjective evaluation of the impact of the issue on
the community; and evidence that the issue was "the subject of vigorous
debate with substantial elements of the community in opposition to one
another."'' 0 It would appear that if all of these elements were met, there
would be no further need to employ the fairness doctrine to insure that
the public be informed.
In case after case, complainants failed to meet their burden of proof.
One viewer objected to a one hour interview program featuring two
spokesmen opposed to a recent United Nations resolution which
equated Zionism with racism.' 0' That individual was requesting that
views in favor of the resolution be aired. The Commission, dismissing
the action, explained that the viewer had failed to demonstrate "that
there is any substantial ongoing debate in this country as to whether
Zionism is a form of racism. ' 1 The viewer had specified that the con-
troversial issue was whether or not to support the resolution. The FCC,
by its response, changed the issue to whether or not Zionism is racism,
and then proceeded to fault the complainant for insufficient proof.
Usually the FCC discounts the broadcaster's use of airtime as proof of
the public importance of a particular topic. In this case, though, the
licensee's decision to devote one full hour to the discussion of the U.N.
resolution should have been an indicator of the issue's importance.
C. Overall Programming
In addition to establishing that an issue is controversial and of public
importance, the viewer must submit proof to the Commission that
balanced coverage has not appeared in overall programming. One Com-
missioner blasted this "procedural straight-jacket":
Security World Publishing Co., 59 F.C.C.2d 107 (1976).
n Id As evidence the viewer noted that eight states had enacted restrictive
and protective legislation, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration had
adopted a model statute, and "60 Minutes" devoted a segment of its program to
the issue. Id at 108-09.
10 Id at 108.
101 Douglas J. Allam, 58 F.C.C.2d 181 (1976).
,02 Id at 182.
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Besides being an unreasonable requirement with no legal basis,
it is ludicrous for this Commission to sanction a procedural rule
requiring members of the public to submit proof of something
the licensee has not broadcast .... Only the most myopic inter-
pretation of our fairness guidelines would require complainants
to set forth with precision what the licensee has not broadcast
before we will consider the merits of the complaint."3
The Commission has continued to espouse its policy of encouraging
"robust, wide-open debate on issues of public importance,"1 °4 at the same
time as it has increased the procedural requirements to bring com-
plaints. For instance, one viewer objected to three separate infractions
by a licensee: 1) violation of a sponsorship identification rule; 2)
discriminatory practices toward certain candidates for public office; and
3) news censorship."' The Commission rejected the first count because
the announcement complained of was four years old and verification was
impossible. Secondly, the FCC dismissed the claim of discriminatory
practices toward certain political candidates. That charge was based
upon facts collected when the complainant inspected the station's
political file and discovered different rate charges for equal time
segments, quantitative and qualitative differences in the content of
political announcements and station personnel assistance to some can-
didates but not to others."6 Despite these apparent discrepancies, the
FCC dismissed the claim because the complainant failed to prove that
there were no other reasonable explanations for the differences. The
burden of proof was on the complainant, even though the licensee would
have been in a better position to explain. Lastly, the third portion of the
complaint alleging news suppression was similarly rejected by the FCC.
The viewer had submitted quotes by the station manager that he was
directly ordered not to cover particular stories "because the wrong peo-
ple would look bad."101 The FCC explained that the complainant had fail-
ed to show that the licensee's actions were based on private, rather than
public interests. Once again, the complainant was saddled with an im-
possible burden of proof. This proof requirement also ran contrary to
previous FCC rulings in which motive was determined irrelevant in the
fulfillment of a licensee's obligation to the public. 108 The question has
become whether the complainant can establish sufficient evidence to re-
10 Diocesan Union of Holy Name Societies, 43 F.C.C.2d 548, 549 (1973)
(Johnson, Comm'r, in dissent). See Ponder v. NBC, 58 F.C.C.2d 1222 (1976).
104 Allen C. Phelps, 21 F.C.C.2d 12, 13 (1970).
100 Melvin Pulley, 58 F.C.C.2d 1224 (1976).
106 Id at 1225-26.
10 Id at 1226.





quire an inquiry, not whether the licensee was guilty of fairness viola-
tions.
The answer directly corrolates with the FCC's agreement with the
substance of the attack. The FCC approach to cases regarding women's
rights illustrates this anomaly. Although a United States Court of Ap-
peals has ruled that the Commission must hold an evidentiary hearing
to resolve claims of fairness doctrine violations, 9 the Commission avoid-
ed that result in one case by concluding that the petitioners' objection
to a license renewal had not raised substantial and material questions of
fact." The National Organization for Women (NOW) had insisted that
the licensee's overall programming, including entertainment and com-
mercials, had presented an "overwhelmingly one-dimensional portrayal
of women as wives, mothers, homemakers and sex objects, valued pri-
marily for their supportive services and their physical attractiveness.'
The FCC, while acknowledging that fairness violations could arise in the
context of entertainment or commercial programming, upheld the
licensee's determination that these programs contained no true discus-
sion of that admittedly controversial issue. The Commission reasoned
that the entertainment and commercial programming at issue bore only
a "'tenuous relationship' to the role of women in society,"'"2 and
therefore did not constitute fairness violations by implication." 3
D. Licensee Discretion
The FCC reiterates that its function in handling fairness doctrine
complaints is to determine whether a licensee has acted reasonably and
in good faith. Broad discretion is accorded to the broadcaster to avoid
excessive government interference with day-to-day journalistic decision-
making. In fact, the Commission has expressly rejected the adoption of
guidelines to aid licensees in their task."' Enforcement of this par-
"' United Church of Christ v. FCC (Lamar Life), 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
"' American Broadcasting Co., 52 F.C.C.2d 98, 98 (1975).
Id. at 110.
11 Id. at 116. See also Females Opposed to Equality, 42 F.C.C.2d 434 (1973)
(the Commission rejected the contention that presentation of the "Helen Reddy"
show presented one side of a controversial issue of public importance, "Women's
Lib." Mere allegation failed to establish discussion of the issue); see generally Na-
tional Organization for Women v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (the court of
appeals upheld the FCC rejection of a claim to deny a license renewal based upon
unfair representation of women in licensee's employment practices).
I In a parallel case, the Commission explained that "petitioners' descriptions
of women's roles . . . are too insubstantial or ambiguous for us to determine that
the mere playing of the role transmits any clear or singular message
demonstrably linked to a controversial issue of public importance." National
Broadcasting Co., 52 F.C.C.2d 273, 287 (1975), aff'd, 555 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
"I In National Broadcasting Co., 14 F.C.C.2d 713 (1968) the Commission com-
mented, "we do not believe it appropriate for this agency to specify the par-
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ticularly vague standard has predictably led to incongruous results. For
instance, an application for license renewal prompted the Commission to
investigate claims of alleged fairness violations. " 5 The station had
broadcast several in-house editorials in opposition to the enrollment of
the first black student at the University of Mississippi. The licensee's
response revealed that no local programming of opposing viewpoints
was aired. "' The licensee, however, considered a national address by
President Kennedy carried by the station as sufficient to counter the
locally-produced editorials. The Commission acknowledged these "sub-
stantial efforts to comply with the 'fairness doctrine.'" .7 In addition to
balanced programming, the Commission questioned the licensee's
motive in appealing to listeners to assemble at the university on a par-
ticular day when the station knew that violence was predictable from
past events. Ultimately, the FCC declined to "delve further into this
sensitive area,""8 and granted the license renewal for the regular three-
year period."'
The discretion that the FCC accords the licensee applies also to pro-
gram selection. According to the Commission, the licensee is required to
meet fairness obligations only in its overall programming, rather than
within a particular program. 2' In the 1974 Fairness Report 2 ' the Com-
mission clarified its position:
We do not believe that it is either appropriate or feasible for a
governmental agency to make decisions as to what is desirable
in each situation .... Ordinarily there are a variety of spokes-
men and formats which could reasonably be deemed ap-
propriate. We believe that the public is best served by a system
which allows broadcasters considerable discretion in selecting
the manner of coverage, the appropriate spokesmen, and the
techniques of production and presentation.'
ticular route to be taken by a licensee in order to exercise reasonable diligence...."
Id. at 716.
"5 Columbus Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 641 (1965).
11 The Commission instructed the station to submit "the specific program
from whatever source and of any nature .... dealing with the issue of racial in-
tegration." Id. at 641 (emphasis added). This was done in spite of prior rulings
which limited the burden of proof imposed on the licensee. See note 75 supra.
'7 Id. at 642.
.1 Id. at 643.
"9 Id at 642-43. Alternatively, the Commission could have granted only a pro-
bationary license or a one year renewal.
" See Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 8. See also note 11 supra and accom-
panying text.
121 Id




In contrast to this stated policy of nonintervention, the licensee's
discretion is often circumvented by FCC action. For instance, the Com-
mission stated that it would be "patently unreasonable for a licensee
consistently to present one side [of an issue] in prime time and to
relegate the contrasting viewpoints to periods outside prime time.""1 3 In
addition, local programming is preferred over national or network offer-
ings to meet community needs, and the Commission frequently finds it
necessary to scrutinize the length and frequency of the presentation."'
E. The FCC's Role
The FCC has repeatedly disclaimed its role as factfinder. "The Com-
mission is not the national arbiter of the truth .... [I]n this democracy,
no Government agency can authenticate the news, or should try to do
so.
' 
125 It is ironic that those oft quoted lines originated in the Commis-
sion's opinion letter for Hunger in America.26 In that case, CBS had pro-
duced and aired the documentary, "Hunger in America," which showed,
in part, an infant alleged to be suffering from malnutrition who was be-
ing treated in a hospital. 2 7 The complaint charged that the facts sur-
rounding the baby's condition and subsequent death were falsely
reported. The FCC launched an investigation of the allegations in an effort
to ascertain: 1) the identify of the baby shown; 2) his condition at the
time of filming; 3) cause of death; and 4) physical condition of the baby's
parents. The Commission explained that the facts were needed to deter-
mine if the licensee had acted reasonably under the circumstances. The
Commission examined hospital records and conducted interviews with
the parents, doctors, nurses and hospital social workers. 8 When find-
ings resulted in contradictory evidence, they concluded the following:
"The Commission cannot appropriately enter the quagmire of in-
vestigating the credibility of the newsman and the interviewed party in
such a type case. Rather, the matter should be referred to the licensee
for its own investigation and appropriate handling."'' Few cases exhibit
'" Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues v. CBS, 25
F.C.C.2d 283, 293 (1970).
12 See William C. Zosel v. Station KGHL, 52 F.C.C.2d 644 (1975) (the FCC
determined that the licensee had provided balanced coverage of future construc-
tion of generating plants).
125 Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969).
"' Id This case is often cited for the proposition that the FCC is not a fact-
finder, despite an extensive fact-finding investigation by the Commission.
11 The narration which accompanied the hospital scene was as follows:
"Hunger is easy to recognize when it looks like this. This baby is dying of starva-
tion. He was an American. Now he is dead." Id at 143.
" There was question whether the baby filmed was correctly identified. Id at
145-46.
" Id at 151. See also WBBMITV, 18 F.C.C.2d 124 (1969). A complaint alleged
that the station, through the actions of its reporter, participated in arranging a
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greater contradiction between FCC policy statements and their real-life
actions. Further, it is precisely the licensee's good faith that is being
challenged in fairness complaints. It appears ludicrous to rely on the
licensee's good faith judgment to determine whether the licensee has
exercised good faith in its past obligations.
While the Commission claims to defer to the licensee's judgment, the
Commission may, within its regulatory scheme, arbitrarily choose to
closely examine that licensee's decision and determine its reason-
ableness. Such was the case in William C. Zosel v. Station KGHL. 130 A
complaint was lodged against the licensee for imbalanced treatment of a
utility company's plan to build coalburning generating plants. The FCC
proceeded to evaluate the number of spot ads, length of ad time, hour of
day for airing and dates of broadcast, and concluded that the licensee
had acted reasonably. This action must be compared with the Commis-
sion's mandate to remain uninvolved in programming decisions.
Interference with program content is even more apparent in in-
stances where the Commission, within its discretion, determines that
the licensee has acted unreasonably. To illustrate, in Patsy Mink v. Sta-
tion WHAR, 1 1 the complaint alleged that the broadcaster had failed to
air any programming on strip-mining, a controversial issue of particular
interest to the local community. This charge was precipitated by the
licensee's refusal to air a tape which represented a position against
strip-mining position. In response to the Commission's inquiry, the
licensee indicated that, while he had originated no local programming,
he had carried news service stories and network public affairs programs
on the issue. He argued that, absent precedent or agency rule to the
contrary, the FCC could not require a particular licensee to cover any
particular issue."' "Any attempt by the government to designate the
issues which must be discussed by a licensee 'enfleshes [the] ... specter
of censorship,' and would interfere with the licensee's discretion under
the fairness doctrine to determine the nature and amount of coverage to
be given to particular subject matter."'3 3 The Commission, in response,
emphasized its duty to ensure that the public be informed. This could
"pot party" at a university for the purpose of filming a special report. The FCC
investigated to determine the factual question regarding the reporter's involve-
ment. Id at 125. The inquiry did not end with the finding that managment had no
knowledge of wrongdoing on the part of the reporter. The Commission held the
licensee responsible. The FCC chastised management for failing to contact the
participants directly for verification, despite the demand for anonymity. The
FCC rejected the notion that such action would infringe on the licensee's freedom
of speech and press. Id at 138.
52 F.C.C.2d 644 (1975).
59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).





best be accomplished, the FCC explained, "through a system in which
the individual broadcaster exercises wide journalistic discretion."'3
However, if an issue is "so critical" or of "such great public importance,"
the FCC may require appropriate licensee compliance.' 5 The Commis-
sion faulted the licensee for failure to provide any discussion of the local
ramifications of the issue. Total reliance on outside programming was
considered a derogation of the licensee's duty to inform the public, and
the licensee was compelled to meet fairness obligations. 3 ' Commissioner
Robinson, in a concurring statement,"37 expressed grave doubts as to the
doctrine's continued viability: "[M]easuring the uncertain benefits of
this law against its probable adverse effects on free speech, I believe we
would be better off without it, or with some substitute access rule.... .'"'
Robinson cautioned that the discretion exercised by the FCC in this
"critical issues" concept was even more threatening than the discretion
accorded the licensee. He concluded, "I shall not be surprised if, as a
consequence of our action today, the Commission soon finds itself involved
more deeply in program judgments than it presently desires or even
foresees." '139
IV. COMMERCIALS
The arbitrariness of FCC action is particularly evident in application
of the fairness doctrine to commercial advertisements.' 0 The first case
to extend the doctrine to commercials involved cigarette adver-
tisements. In WCBS-TV(Banzhaf),"' the FCC held, and the appellate court
134 Id. at 994.
" In its letter to the licensee, the Commission cited Red Lion as authority for
remedial action by the FCC under these circumstances. Id. at 994. This reliance
may have been misplaced. While a quoted passage from Red Lion noted that the
Commission was now powerless to deal with "timorous" licensees, the Court
recognized remedial authority in Congress, not the FCC. Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969).
13. 59 F.C.C.2d at 997.
SId. at 998.
13 Id.
" Id. at 999.
140 See generally Note, FCC's Impact on Product Advertising, 46 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 463 (1980); Note, The Fairness Doctrine and Access to Reply to Product
Commercials, 51 IND. L.J. 156 (1976); Comment, Application of the Fairness Doc-
trine to Ordinary Product Advertisement: National Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting v. FCC, 20 B.C.L. REV. 425 (1979).
" WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, upon reconsideration, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), aff'd
sub nom., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
842 (1969). Also at issue was whether the FCC action was compatible with the
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 et seq.
(1976). Upon reconsideration, Commissioner Loevinger, in concurrence, sup-
ported the majority decision based on social and moral grounds but questioned
its procedural and substantive efficacy. 9 F.C.C.2d at 952 (concurring opinion).
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affirmed, that the fairness doctrine could be applied to commercials that
implicated a controversial issue of public importance. Since cigarettes
raised crucial public health concerns, the FCC was within its statutory
authority and had an obligation to regulate in the public interest. In the
court's view, the licensee's judgment that the ads did not constitute a
controversial issue of public importance was unreasonable under the cir-
cumstances. The broadcaster was required to provide a significant
amount of time to responsible spokespersons with opposing views.
Shortly thereafter, the FCC was faced with another claim of imbalanced
coverage due to cigarette advertisements.' 2 Investigating a petition to
revoke the broadcaster's license, the Commission recognized a disparity
between the number of smoking and anti-smoking messages,' but con-
cluded that overall programming was not deficient. Even though the
licensee was clearly violating established guidelines,'" the petition to
revoke was denied. The licensee was merely requested to submit a
statement of future policy.
Fearful that invocation of the fairness doctrine for product adver-
tisements could become unwieldy, the Commission sought to limit ap-
Loevinger criticized that "[t]he 'public interest' is a judgment encompassing
whatever the person making the judgment deems to be socially desirable." Id at
953. Loveinger considered extension of the fairness doctrine to commercial
advertising particularly troublesome since the 1959 amendment to the Com-
munications Act of 1934, source of FCC authority to enforce the doctrine, refer-
red expressly to "news," not advertising. Loevinger foresaw future difficulties
with reverse application, ie., the cigarette sponsor could demand air-time to res-
pond to public service messages. ML at 954. The court of appeals, in affirming the
FCC ruling, limited the decision to these unique circumstances in which public
health measures were at stake. 405 F.2d at 1085.
1 National Broadcasting Co., 16 F.C.C.2d 947 (1969). WNBC-TV, a network
owned station, was the subject of the attack. In the Commission's investigation,
it discovered an 8.1 to 1 ratio of cigarette advertisements to anti-smoking
messages within a two week period.
143 Id. (Johnson, Comm'r, in dissent). Johnson indicated that the disparity was
even greater when combined with two additional factors. First, most cigarette
commercials were aired during prime time periods with larger numbers of young,
susceptible children as viewers. Secondly, these ratios did not include "billboard"
announcements in which commercial sponsors would add a short product promo-
tion to the introduction of an entertainment show.
'" Id. Commissioner Johnson criticized the agency's disparate application of
sanctions between small stations and large corporate licensees.
Time brokerage, false logging, or an abuse of advertisers-such as dou-
ble billing -may actually result in license revocation.... But a network
licensee that ignores a Commission ruling on the life and death issues
surrounding a controversy of such importance that the Commission has
now proposed to outlaw all cigarette advertising entirely .... is merely
sent an apologetic letter politely requesting the network to do better if
it possibly can.
Id. at 949. Commissioner Johnson concluded that the issues raised warranted at




plication to the "unique" circumstances of cigarette smoking. This at-
tempt failed, however, when the court of appeals extended the doctrine
to require the broadcast of union boycott messages when a licensee pro-
vided air time for the picketed store's advertisement.1 5 The court
chastised the FCC for dismissing the charges without adequate in-
vestigation and for failure to follow its own policy statements. '
Further attempts by the FCC to confine this ever-expanding doctrine
were met with similar resistance. In 1971, the FCC refused to extend
the Banzhaf doctrine to gasoline and automobile commercials." 7 A com-
plaint alleged that the broadcaster failed to carry a reasonable amount
of information on air pollution resulting from fuel emissions to counter
product advertisements. The court of appeals rejected the Commission's
distinction between the hazards of cigarette smoking and those of air
pollution as unreasonable and ordered that the fairness doctrine be in-
voked.'48
During the next few years, confusion over the proper application of
the fairness doctrine to product advertisements mounted.'49 Finally, in
1974, the Commission issued a policy statement that "in the future, we
will apply the fairness doctrine only to those 'commercials' which are
devoted in an obvious and meaningful way to the discussion of public
issues."' 5 The FCC attempted to classify advertisements into three
categories: editorial advertisements, product efficacy messages, and
standard product commercials.15 ' The fairness doctrine would apply only
to editorials that consisted of "direct and substantial commentary on im-
portant public issues," ' 2 not to efficacy claims or standard product
145 Retail Store Employees Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
148 The court noted that the Commission had announced in Banzhaf that fre-
quency of spot ads should play a role in fairness determinations, yet the FCC fail-
ed to consider that factor in the instant case.
147 Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
'" Id. at 1169. That same year the FCC ruled that NBC had violated the
fairness doctrine by refusing balanced programming on the controversial issue of
the Alaskan pipeline which was promoted in gas line company messages. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 30 F.C.C.2d 643 (1971).
"I See National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095,
1099-1102 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) for
historical development of the fairness doctrine as applied to commercial adver-
tisements. See generally Yasser, Federal Communications Commission v. Na-
tional Citizen's Committee for Broadcasting: The Ultimate Media Hype, 67 KY.
L.J. 903 (1979).
's Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 26.
,51 Id. at 22.
'5 Id. The Commission considered the Federal Trade Commission more ap-
propriate to deal with claims of false advertising. See also Adoption of Standards
Designed to Eliminate Deceptive Advertising from Television, 32 F.C.C.2d 360
(1971).
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advertisements.'53 Unfortunately, these new standards failed to solve
the problem of how to determine when a message was an "editorial"
containing "obvious and meaningful" discussion of a controversial issue.
Whether or not children's advertising would be within the purview of
the new standards was tested in Council on Children, Media and Mer-
chandising v. ABC and CBS."' The complaint charged the two networks
with failing to cover the controversial issue relating to "children's
advertising" in both implicit commercial messages directed at children
and explicit news and public affairs programs directed at adults. The
complainant urged the regulation of children's advertising on public in-
terest grounds. Both networks denied that product commercials
directed at children constituted a controversial issue of public impor-
tance.15' The FCC, in support of the networks' position, said that the pro-
per focus "is not whether the advertisements in question implicitly ad-
dress a controversial issue of public importance, but rather, whether
such an issue is addressed '.. . in an obvious and meaningful way .... ISO
Despite express recognition of special concerns about programming
directed toward children,"7 the Commission refused to impose fairness
obligations on the licensee. The FCC based its decision on past policy
statements that the fairness doctrine would not apply to standard pro-
duct commercials." The complaint failed to present a prima facie case
that an advertisement addressed a controversial issue of public impor-
tance "in an obvious and meaningful way ...."'59
The inability of the Commission to exercise reasoned, consistent rule-
making authority is highlighted in Public Media Center v. FCC.6 ' Initially,
a complaint was filed with the Commission alleging that thirteen radio
stations had violated their fairness doctrine obligations by failing to pro-
vide balanced programming on the issue of nuclear power. Each station
had broadcast a series of sixty second announcements sponsored by a
local utility company. Responses from a majority of the licensees denied
153 Id. at 24-26.
15 59 F.C.C.2d 448 (1976). See also Action for Children's Television, Inc., 32
F.C.C.2d 412 (1971). In that case the FCC concluded that alleged deceptive adver-
tising by two toy manufacturers in commercials directed at children did not con-
stitute a controversial issue or raise fairness obligations.
"' 59 F.C.C.2d at 449. Contra, Note, Case for FTC Regulation of Television
Advertising Directed Toward Children, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 513 (1980),
1 59 F.C.C.2d at 453 (quoting from Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 26).
151 Id at 450. The Commission enumerated the steps it had taken in the past to
regulate children's advertising, such as adoption of limitations on the amount of
commercial time during children's programs, and requirement of separation of
commercial matter from entertainment portions.
15 Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 26.
"' 59 F.C.C.2d at 453.




that the messages constituted a controversial issue of public impor-
tance, and the remaining stations asserted that they had provided
balanced coverage. The Commission established that the issue was of a
sufficiently controversial nature and proceeded to evaluate licensee
compliance. Ultimately, the findings were that eight licensees had acted
unreasonably in the exercise of their discretion, one was questionable
and required further study, and four had met their obligation to inform
the public. What remains troublesome about this outcome is the manner
in which the Commission reached its conclusion.
The FCC asserted that "there is no mathmatical formula or
mechanical requirement for achieving fairness, ' '.. 1 and proceeded to ex-
amine the performance of each licensee. In one instance, a violation was
found based on the frequency of presentation and a 3:1 ratio. However,
in another instance, a licensee with a ratio of 60:27 had met his respon-
sibility absent any frequency data. The court of appeals determined that
the FCC findings were inconsistent and remanded for failure of the FCC
to clearly and explicitly articulate its standards.' Judge Tamm, writing
for the court, expanded on the agency's continual lack of consistency:
A survey of Commission precedent reveals that the standard for
determining what constitutes a "reasonable opportunity" has
yet to be chisled into stone. While its decisions are in accord
with this court's general command that "the essential basis for
any fairness doctrine . . . is that the American public must not
be left uninformed," the Commission has used differing factors
to define a reasonable opportunity. Its decisions have relied up-
on the amount of time allotted each point of view, the frequency
with which points of view are aired, the repetitive, continuous
nature of programming, the amount of programming broadcast
during prime time, and on occasion, the Commission has acted
without explicit reference to any of these factors. As then Com-
mission Chairman Burch stated, "in the fairness area, the bond
of theory and implementation has come unstuck and all the prin-
cipal actors-licensees, public interest advocates, the Commis-
sion itself-are in limbo, left to fend for themselves.' 6 3
Upon remand, the FCC, without further factual information, summarily
reversed its original findings and held all of the licensees in violation of
the fairness doctrine.'6 4
161 Public Media Center, 59 F.C.C.2d 494, 517 (1976), remanded, 587 F.2d 1322
(D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand, 72 F.C.C.2d 776 (1979) (quoting Mid-Florida Televi-
sion Corp., 40 F.C.C. 620, 621 (1964)). See generally Energy Action Comm., Inc.,
64 F.C.C.2d 787 (1977).
162 587 F.2d at 1331.
Id. at 1328-29 (quoting from Wilderness Society, 31 F.C.C.2d 729, 734
(1971)).
IN 72 F.C.C.2d 776 (1979).
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V. POLITICAL MESSAGES
A. Slanted News Coverage
The FCC has repeatedly emphasized that "[r]igging or slanting the
news is a heinous act against the public interest-indeed, there is no act
more harmful to the public's ability to handle its affairs." 115 In view of
the seriousness of the offense, one would assume that this act would
carry very severe penalties. This, however, was not the result reached
in National Broadcasting Co.' In that case the Commission had become
aware of a conflict of interest which resulted in biased reporting by
Chet Huntley, a nationally known and well-respected newscaster. On
several occasions Huntley had attacked recently enacted meat inspec-
tion legislation when, in fact, he owned a cattle ranch and had a signifi-
cant interest in a cattle-feeding firm."6 7 In its ruling, the Commission em-
phasized the need for network's special diligence to ensure that jour-
nalistic decisions are not influenced by outside interests."' The FCC
criticized NBC for inadequate handling of the matter, since NBC knew
or should have known of Huntley's involvement. NBC's approval of the
anti-inspection editorials constituted "a failure to exercise reasonable
diligence or to fulfill the public interest requirements in this important
area."'69 Despite this finding and the seriousness of the offense, in effect
16 Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969). See Jim Myers, 69 F.C.C.2d
963 (1978) (complaint alleged, in part, censorship and news manipulation concern-
ing the effects of TV violence).
10 14 F.C.C.2d 713 (1968). See also James Waller, 57 F.C.C.2d 1281 (1976). Com-
plainant alleged bias in pro-gun control programming, which included an editorial
comment by Howard K. Smith. The FCC rejected the claim on three alternative
grounds. First, where the complaint alleged bias in episodes of two different
series, the FCC dismissed for failure to detail specific situations. Next, the com-
plaint cited omissions in particular programs, but the FCC attributed that to
licensee discretion. Finally, the Commission acknowledged that the editorial by
Howard K. Smith raised fairness obligations, but the complainant had failed to
show that these were not met in overall programming. Id at 1282-84.
" Huntley was executive vice-president and a director of Group 21 who sold
most of its products to Spencer Packing who in turn sold to Edmund Mayer, Inc.
The latter corporation came under federal meat inspection with the Wholesome
Meat Act of 1967, the very same legislation that Huntley had attacked. In addi-
tion, two of the directors of Edmund Mayer, Inc. were directors and shareholders
in Group 21, and one was president.
1 14 F.C.C.2d at 715-16. It is the duty of the licensee to be aware of conflicts
of interest and take whatever remedial action is necessary. The Commission sug-
gested that if conflict is minimal or insignificant, no action would be necessary; if
it were great, substitution of another reporter might be appropriate. In some cir-
cumstances the licensee might choose to allow the reporter to continue but
divulge the nature of the conflict to the audience. See Cromwell-Collier Broad-
casting Corp., 14 F.C.C.2d 358 (1968). See also Gross Telecasting, Inc., 14 F.C.C.2d
239 (1968).




no action was taken against the network. NBC was merely requested to
submit a letter with proposed procedure revisions. In dissent, Commis-
sioner Johnson stressed the seriousness of management's complicity and
warned of "abuse by conglomerate corporate licensees generally."17 He
cautioned that this type of abuse manifested itself in covert, subtle ac-
tivity difficult to detect but destructive to the notion of unbiased repor-
ting. In view of the economic corporate structure of the media, he cau-
tioned, there is danger that reporting of events, such as elections, the
Vietnam war, or the space program, may be influenced by the network's
business concerns rather than its commitment to serve the public in-
terest."'
One of the issues raised by Johnson, namely opposition to the Viet-
nam war, has met with considerable disfavor by the FCC and the courts.
For instance, in 1970, at the height of the war, several separate com-
plaints were lodged with the FCC for licensee failure to allow response
time to armed forces recruitment messages in order to present informa-
tion on military deferment.7 One viewer unsuccessfully argued that due
to the controversy surrounding the war, licensees had an obligation to
allow presentation of alternatives for discharging one's military obliga-
tion.' He urged application of the Banzhaf doctrine 7 " to the recruit-
170 Id at 720. He continued:
What appears to be self-interest is often camouflaged by "news
judgment." How would one "prove" that RCA/NBC gives more coverage
to space shots and NASA news (or the Vietnam war) than it would if it
were not a major space and defense contractor? (Defense business was
18 percent of RCA's total sales in 1967). How does one investigate any
possible relationship between NBC's coverage of foreign governments
and RCA's corporate relations with those governments? (In 1967 alone,
RCA established major new investments in Australia, Canada, Italy,
Mexico, Puerto Rico, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom.) Even in this
case, RCA/NBC asserts, "we ... will continue to cover news and views
on this issue [meat], based on our reasonable, good faith judgment in the
particular circumstances." More difficult yet, how does one even know of
all the economic interests of a conglomerate corporation like RCA and
all its employees?
Id. at 721.
17 Id at 732-33. Johnson criticized the Commissioner's failure to impose
stronger sanctions in light of the seriousness of the offense and possible implica-
tions.
" See generally Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973) (the Supreme Court affirmed an FCC ruling that the general policy
of a licensee to refuse political "editorial" messages did not violate the Com-
munications Act or the first amendment); Alan Neckritz, 24 F.C.C.2d 175 (1970),
affd, 446 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1971); San Francisco Women For Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d
156 (1970).
' Alan Neckritz, 24 F.C.C.2d at 175.
1 Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969). The court in Banzhaf applied the fairness doctrine to commercial cigarette
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ment ads. This was not persuasive to the Commission, which upheld the
licensee's judgment that armed forces recruitment messages did not
raise the issue of the war in Vietnam. 175
In a similar case17 the result was the same. The Commission found
that the messages merely asserted the undisputed right of the army to
recruit members, similar to recruitment messages for policemen or
teachers. Commissioner Johnson, in dissent, ridiculed the majority's
reasoning because "it merely illustrates the principle that determined
men, if they try hard enough, can define any problem out of
existence.' ' 77 He considered it ludicrous to propose that the subjects,
recruitment and anti-draft, were not hopelessly enmeshed. The court of
appeals, however, resolved the controversy over recruitment messages
in accordance with the FCC's majority position. Reviewing a case with
similar facts,7 8 the court sustained the FCC's determination. The
licensee had acted reasonably when he denied existence of a controver-
sial issue of public importance through recruitment messages. The court
stressed, in dicta, that the essential basis of the fairness doctrine is that
"the American public must not be left uninformed,"'179 Since the con-
troversy over the war was so extensive, the court explained, the
absence of those views seeking exposure would not leave the public
uninformed.'
Commission support of biased treatment of the war issue was most
evident in Student Assoc. of the St. Univ. of N. Y.'8" The complaint alleged
improper broadcast censorship by ABC. The network had televised a
college football game, but during an anti-war half-time show cameras
were focused away from the field.'' Prior to the game, ABC had an-
nounced its decision to black-out the show because of its "definite
advertisements recognizing that controversial issues could be raised by implica-
tion. "It is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda,
which may be heard even if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought
greater than the impact of the written word." Id at 100-101. See notes 141-44
supra.
"I Contra, car advertisements did raise the issue of air pollution. See notes
147-48 supra and accompanying text.
11" San Francisco Women For Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d 156 (1970).
117 Id at 163.
1 Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
1 Id at 329.
'8' This reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the procedural requirement of
establishing public importance before an issue will be considered. See notes
92-100 supra and accompanying text.
181 40 F.C.C.2d 510 (1973).
82 Id at 510. Prior to the broadcast, an ABC sports producer had been inform-
ed of the intended program by its initiators and according to complainants,
"reacted by stressing ABC's concern that the program not alienate 'potential





political implications."" 3 Then, less than one month later during the
Army-Navy game, ABC telecast the half-time show which attempted to
rally support for P.O.W.'s, complete with West Point cadets and other
military personnel. In response to the complaint, ABC management at-
tempted to distinguish the two shows by explaining that the latter had no
political viewpoint. In addition, the licensee claimed that the decision
was within its discretion. The FCC recognized that ABC would be shirk-
ing its duty if it "arbitrarily and discriminately refused to broadcast
valid ideas which are controversial."""4 In this case, however, it was
merely refusing this particular program, a refusal within its discretion.
B. Political Implications
Nowhere is arbitrary application of the fairness doctrine more
dangerous than in the political arena.1 15 In Network Coverage of the
Democratic Nat'l Convention,"'8 the Commission had received numerous
complaints against all three networks involving the coverage of the
Democratic National Convention of 1968. The charges ranged from
failure to give views of local city government officials regarding alleged
police brutality, to failure to depict violence initiated by anti-war
demonstrators. Also included were claims of excessive emphasis on
floor activity at the convention to the detriment of podium coverage,
and claims of deliberate staging of violence connected with the anti-war
demonstrations. All three networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) responded
that although there were difficult circumstances and technological
limitations for coverage outside the Convention hall, they had provided
a fair and balanced presentation of the issues. CBS also protested the
Commission's request for licensee comments as being "in direct con-
travention to strong and frequently eloquent disavowels by the Commis-
sion of supervisory concern over the content of particular programs." '187
Further, the network urged that section 326 of the Communications Act
"should be regarded by the Commission as giving it an affirmative
obligation to support the independence of broadcast news." ' In a
similar protest, NBC argued:
1 Id. at 510-11.
Id at 516.
Justice Douglas observed that "[olver and over again, attempts have been
made to use the Commission as a political weapon against the opposition,
whether to the left or to the right." Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 167 (1973) (concurring opinion). He warned
that in view of first amendment restrictions, Commission action "must be carefully
confined lest broadcasting- now our most powerful media-be used to subdue
the minorities or help produce a Nation of people who walk submissively to the
executive's notions of the public good." Id at 167.
18 16 F.C.C.2d 650 (1969).
M7 Id at 652-53.
188 Id at 653.
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[Flew spectres can be more frightening to a person concerned
with the vitality of a free press than the vision of a television
cameraman turning his camera to one aspect of a public event
rather than another because of concern that a governmental
agency might want him to do so, or fear of Government sanction
if he did not.'
In response, the Commission reviewed prevailing FCC policy. The FCC
characterized the fairness, equal opportunity, and personal attack doc-
trines as exceptions to the general rule that the FCC does not "review
the broadcaster's news judgment, the quality of his news and public af-
fairs reporting, or his taste."'" The Commission further explained that
the fairness doctrine did not "in any way prescribe the presentation of a
news item or viewpoint nor does it specify any particular manner of
presentation."'9 Ultimately, the Commission rejected all of the claims
because there was insufficient evidence to prove that the networks had
not provided balanced coverage of the issues. In answer to allegations of
"staged" incidents by certain reporters, the Commission responded that
"[w]e shall continue our consideration of the above matters."'92 This ap-
pears to be another example of the Commission's "raised eyebrow" ap-
proach to regulation. Even though many of the complaints raise serious
political implications, the Commission remains helpless to remedy the
inherent propensity toward political manipulation of this fragile doctrine.
The Commission's espoused policy of nonintervention into program-
ming decisions must be kept in mind when examining another case,
Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues.193 That
complainant objected to five Presidential messages broadcast live in
their entirety during prime time. The messages presented the ad-
ministration's views on Southeast Asia. The Commission noted that this
was not a question of equal opportunity since the President was not a
political candidate, nor was there a question that the networks had not
2 Id. at 654.
'Id. In view of the excessive number of complaints that arise out of these
three mentioned doctrines it appears as if the exceptions are outnumbering the
general rule.
191 Id at 655 (emphasis added).
' Id at 659. The licensees were called upon to make further inquiry and sub-
mit a report.
1 25 F.C.C.2d 283 (1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., CBS v. FCC, 454
F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Henry M. Buchanan, 42 F.C.C.2d 430 (1973).
The FCC rejected a personal attack claim lodged by a brother of a Presidential
aide for a "CBS Evening News" report. The report allegedly associated the com-
plainant with the Watergate scandal, an admittedly controversial issue of public
importance. The Commission rejected the claim because "mention of a specific
person or group does not itself constitute a controversial issue of public impor-
tance unless that person or group is controversial." Id. at 432. Query how any




presented contrasting viewpoints in overall programming. Rather, the
Commission considered the unique circumstances of an "outstanding
spokesman" on one side of an issue,"' and determined that licensee ac-
tion would be patently unreasonable unless at least one more uninter-
rupted opportunity by an appropriate spokesman to respond was pro-
vided. This result is completely contrary to the Commission's statement
in Democratic Nat'l Convention that the fairness doctrine does not "in
any way prescribe the presentation of a news item or viewpoint nor
does it specify any particular manner of presentation."19'
These two cases, Democratic Nat'l Convention and Fair Broadcasting,
clearly illustrate the dichotomy of the fairness doctrine as applied. If
strictly enforced, impermissible incursion on the free speech and press
rights of the licensee results. If not strictly enforced, the doctrine
becomes subject to manipulation to support the views of those in control
of the media, and the public is mistakenly told that fairness obligations
are being met.
VI. SOLUTION: REPEAL
Although the Court in Red Lion upheld the constitutionality of the
fairness doctrine on its face, subsequent application could not pass
direct constitutional attack. While in theory the fairness doctrine
presents an idealistic goal of our democracy, in practice it is fraught
with infringment of constitutionally protected rights and should be
revoked. Continuation of such an ineffectual and even dangerous doc-
trine only erodes the framework of our democratic system. The FCC
should not insist that the doctrine protects the viewers' right of access
to information, or the broadcasters' right to freedom of speech and
press, when the opposite is true.'"
194 25 F.C.C.2d at 297. Contra, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 481 F.2d 543
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (court of appeals rejected a similar request and supported the
FCC's ruling that there was no automatic right of reply to Presidential
messages). In Ad Hoc Committee to Defeat the Transportation Bond Issue, 32
F.C.C.2d 458 (1970), the Commission rejected a complaint that alleged qualitative
and quantitative differences in the licensee's coverage of a political issue. The
FCC summarily dismissed the complainant's plea to examine disparate impact of
the messages and concluded that the licensee had acted reasonably. Id. at 459.
See generally, Robin Ficker, 65 F.C.C.2d 657 (1977) (coverage of an independent
candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives was reasonable in view of the
licensee's judgment that he was not a leading candidate); Socialist Workers 1968
Nat'l Campaign Comm., 14 F.C.C.2d 858 (1968) (the FCC held that the appearance
of former Governor George Wallace on the program "NET Journal" was exempt
from equal time requirements because the program constituted a bona fide news
interview).
'" See note 191 supra and accompanying text.
IN Most recently, even the FCC has recommended to Congress that the
fairness doctrine be repealed, along with the equal time provisions. FCC Wants To
19811
35Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
CLEVELAND STATE LA W REVIEW
The original goal of the fairness doctrine-to ensure that viewers and
listeners are fully and fairly informed on all issues of public impor-
tance-and the rationale behind initial regulation-airwaves as a scarce
resource and diversity in the marketplace of ideas-no longer require
government intervention. By the time sufficient public importance can
be established to qualify an issue for fairness doctrine protection, most
of the citizenry have already formulated their personal viewpoints on
Dump Equal Time Rule, The Plain Dealer, Sept. 18, 1981, 14-A, Col. 1. This is the
first time in the forty-seven history of the agency that it has expressly une-
quivocally requested the repeal of those statutory requirements. Mark S. Fowler,
Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, stated:
Today, we strike a blow in the cause of freedom. The Constitution
specifically chose the press to improve our free society and keep it free.
The so-called Fairness Doctrine permits this Commission to act as editor
and censor of material broadcast to the people. Someone must edit. Not
all material can be broadcast. I would rather have the editor make these
choices than the government. Some may abuse their position. But as the
Supreme Court stated in 1973 in the CBS v. D.N.C. case: "Calculated
risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher values."
The people, in any event, expect the press to present all sides of con-
troversial issues, and they judge the press accordingly. We must be con-
fident in the people's ability and resourcefulness to make the widest
choice possible. President Reagan has said, "In order for the people to
respect the government, the government must first respect the people."
We make that choice today. Our system of government, of the people, by
the people, and for the people, cannot flourish and improve if govern-
mental regulation or potential regulation of free speech and the press
exists, even vestigially.
This is the time to act in the name of free speech. This is the time to
strike down government's role in determining what the people shall hear
and see.
Statement of Mark S. Fowler, Sept. 17, 1981 (available through F.C.C. Public
Relations Division).
He further emphasized that "[tihe scarcity-of-media-access argument is a
bankrupt one. It is about time that media got the same rights to select material
as newspapers, book publishers and others." F.C.C. Asks End to Fairness, Equal
Time Rules, The New York Times, Friday, Sept. 18, 1981, 13, Col. 1, at col. 2 A
spokesperson for a special interest group criticized the legislative proposals:
It's official now. The F.C.C. has become the lobbying arm of the broad-
casting industry. The Supreme Court has held in case after case that the
fairness doctrine protects the First Amendment rights of the public.
Fortunately, we don't think Congress is ready to turn the Constitution
on its head.
Id at col. 3. In the past, attempts to repeal the fairness doctrine have been unsuc-
cessful. See, e.g., S.2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 211 (1975); S.22, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 539 (1977); S.622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REC. S 2525 (Mar. 2, 1979). None of these prior bills, however, had FCC's outright
endorsement. See generally Note, The Future of Content Regulation in Broad-
casting, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1981), for a discussion of the ramifications of litiga-





the subject. Thus, the need for a forum to air diverse views to inform
the public is eliminated.
In addition, the "scarce resource" justification for regulation of broad-
casters, as compared to the nonintervention policy toward the print
media, is no longer valid. Technological advancements, both in the elec-
tronic media and in communications in general, have dramatically
enhanced the public's opportunity to be well informed. In most
localities, the number of outlets for electronic broadcasts, including
radio, television and especially cable, far exceeds the number of daily
newspapers. Yet regulation that has been rejected as unconstitutional
for print has been permitted against broadcast journalists. Such ar-
bitrary application of constitutional protection should be eliminated. As
Justice Douglas cautioned in the past, "TV and radio, as well as the
more conventional methods for disseminating news, are all included in
the concept of 'press' as used in the First Amendment and therefore are




The free flow of information is a cornerstone of our democracy,
achieved through freedom of speech and press. When our founding
fathers conceived the first amendment, they envisioned dissemination of
information without government interference. At that time, though, the
print media constituted the public's primary source of news. Today,
broadcasters disseminate information to an overwhelming majority of
our citizens. These citizens should be secure in the knowledge that the
preparation of the news they receive is free from government control.
As long as broadcasters make decisions with one eye toward federal
regulators, broadcast journalists will never be members of the free
press.
LORETTA T. MENKES
197 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
161 (1973) (concurring opinion).
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